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PREFACE
Too many people to save the world?
Nowadays we are faced with serious threats such as the current conflict in
Ukraine or extremist groups like Islamic state. So why then talk about some-
thing such as climate change? Don’t we need to focus on the ‘important’ and
‘urgent’ matters? Climate change is urgent. In fact we all know this, but still
not much is done about it. There will be a climate conference in Paris in 2015,
but it seems that we are moving towards it in silence. Somehow we are focused
more on dealing with ‘human’ problems: armed conflicts, civil wars, and ter-
rorist groups. But of course they are related. Value-rational action will always
clash with cultures that do not share these values; instrumental action will al-
ways clash with nature, which is not an instrument. When instrumental action
becomes the leading value of all our actions, one is destined to face both nature
and culture.
However, if one looks more closely to the problem of climate change, one is
surprised: instead of a lack of solutions, there seems to be an overabundance
of it. Who will save us? Politicians will; scientists will; climate movements will;
green economy will; trade unions will; consumers will. Instead of a lack of ac-
tors, we are oversupplied. All of them point to different directions when ex-
plaining what is going wrong and where the solution lies. Different groups
propose their diverse explanations all with their unique catchphrases: green
economy, population bomb, ‘packages don’t litter, people do’, de-growth, tech-
nocracy, et cetera. Inspired by the work of the philosopher of science Gaston
Bachelard, one could wonder: Is this framing of the problem of climate change
in metaphors and images not doomed to oversimplify matters?
Instead of facing one unquestioned idea of climate, we are confronted with
what Phil Macnaghten & John Urry call contested natures: different views on
what climate is, on what nature is, and on what the solution is. This issue of
Global tries to be loyal to this diverse array of perspectives. Sarah Van Eynde
and David Belis focus on international climate relations, especially the role of
China; Jan Van Bavel explains the current situation of population growth and
its possible implications for climate change; Massimiliano Simons investigates
the claim that we need more scientists as MP’s to cope with the problem; Johan
Malcorps directs our attention to the role of contemporary climate movements;
and Matthias Lievens explains to us in an interview why the metaphor of ‘green
economy’ is not as self-evident as often thought.
These articles do not aim to provide one coherent big story about climate
change, a project destined to fail, but instead offers munition to reopen and
rethink the debate. In a way, one could state that there are too many people to
save the world. But faced with these internal debates among our saviours, one
could claim that, perhaps, there are too many worlds to save as well?
Massimiliano Simons
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China in global climate 
politics
Sarah Van Eynde and
David Belis
China has emerged as one of the most powerful
forces in global climate politics. Since the 2009
Copenhagen summit (COP-15 or the 15th Confer-
ence of the Parties to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC),
it has become clear that China's economic rise
has transformed it into a "climate superpower",
capable of making or breaking a global climate
deal, and that it is only rivaled in this position by
the US and arguably the EU. From a Western
point of view, however, it has so far hesitated to
fully live up to its current international status.
Instead, it has focused on domestic policy-mak-
ing efforts in areas such as renewable energy de-
velopment, energy efficiency, car standards, air
pollution, and experiments with carbon trading.
Despite of this positive domestic evolution, its
absolute levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions continue to rise, while the (legal) nature of
its future international engagement also needs
further clarity and maturation. The analysis pre-
sented here first traces the history of China's
strategic positioning in global (climate) politics
and then focuses on the current debates, partic-
ularly in the context of the run-up to the COP-21
negotiations for a new global agreement in Paris,
2015.
When looking at other global agreements such as
the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer or international organ-
izations such as the World Trade Organization
(WTO), it seems that globalization and the global
governance of the economy and the environment
potentially infringe upon state sovereignty, which
asserts that "within its borders the state or gov-
ernment has an entitlement to supreme, unqual-
ified, and exclusive political and legal authority"
(McGrew 2008: 23). The Copenhagen summit
demonstrated once again that sovereignty con-
cerns are a defining feature of this type of global
regimes. In contrast to the WTO and previous
Western-dominated global governance systems,
however, the climate regime is breaking new
ground. China, India and other emerging
economies are having a much larger say than
ever before in how to deal with the issue of sov-
ereignty, due to the relative decline of the West
and rising levels of economic growth and GHG
emissions in the East (and elsewhere). 
China is especially sensitive to issues that touch
upon its sovereignty (Carlson 2005: 3). In the
Cold War period, and especially in the 1970s-
1980s, the Chinese were notorious defenders of
state sovereignty and the principle of non-inter-
vention. In 1983, the Chinese political scholar
Wang Xuan asserted that “[s]tate sovereignty, in
terms of international law, is supreme internally
and independent externally... Any given country
is on an equal footing with other countries and
it brooks no foreign interference and encroach-
ment” (Wang 1983: 125-146). The origins of this
sovereignty understanding go back to the “cen-
tury of humiliation” (1842-1949), which was
closely linked to the so-called “unequal treaties”,
a set of treaties signed in the latter half of the
19th century that were highly in favor of Britain,
Japan and several other foreign powers (Calla-
han 2010; Wang 2005). 
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China’s historical unwillingness to be flexible on
the issue of sovereignty has directly affected
global climate negotiations at various points in
time, even if its conception of the principle as
such is increasingly challenged by far-reaching
economic and environmental globalization. At
the 2009 Copenhagen summit, for example,
China was seen, by some, as obstructing progress
by returning to a “hard” stance on sovereignty,
particularly on the issue of binding commit-
ments (Zhang 2010). This has resulted in Copen-
hagen's "pledge-and-review" approach, which
stands in contrast to the Kyoto Protocol's "legally
binding" nature, although the difference between
what has since been known as "bottom-up" and
"top-down" might be an exaggeration. Canada,
for instance, simply left the club without any con-
sequence in 2011. Still, the structure of the 2015
climate agreement will be different than the one
agreed upon in Kyoto, with more respect for sov-
ereign "contributions", as they are now termed,
instead of an emphasis on (legal?) commitments. 
Let us now turn to some of the specific debates
in international climate negotiations. The latter
are governed by a consensus rule of procedures.
The consensus rule makes it difficult to translate
ambitions and political will (that currently aim
to keep global warming to less than 2°C) into a
deal that is agreed upon by 190+ countries in-
cluded under the UN body. Individual countries,
or blocks of countries such as BASIC (Brazil,
South Africa, India and China), can therefore eas-
ily block progress in international climate nego-
tiations. As the world’s largest emitter, largest
energy consumer and second largest economy,
China has come to the fore as a deal-maker or
deal-breaker in the international arena. Indeed,
a future agreement in which China is absent
makes the agreement ex ante ineffective, as the
agreement will not cover the bulk of global emis-
sions. The different Chinese culture with regard
to international cooperation, sovereignty and the
nature of global governance in combination with
the consensus rule of procedures in international
climate negotiations and the weak effectiveness
of the Kyoto Protocol (since it only covered 30%
of global emissions) make us believe that the way
forward for current international climate nego-
tiations will differ from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol
track. 
For China, the bottleneck in international cli-
mate negotiations relates to adopting binding
emission reduction targets and the control mech-
anism of monitoring, reporting and verification
(MRV). Some possible explanations to China’s re-
luctance towards binding emission reduction tar-
gets and MRV have to do with its traditional
foreign policy interests and principles, nervous-
ness about economic growth and development
and the so-called firewall in international climate
negotiations between developing and developed
countries that was adopted in the UNFCCC, con-
cluded in 1992. On the basis of the principle of
Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and
respective capabilities – known as CBDR for
short – developed and developing countries were
assigned to two different categories known as
Annex I and Non-Annex I Parties respectively.
Non-Annex I Parties, simply put, were not envis-
aged to shoulder similar reduction commitments
as Annex I Parties, and claimed, rightfully, finan-
cial support, capacity building and technology
transfer from the latter. The firewall continues to
be the main stumbling block in negotiations, and
ultimately goes back to the debate on sovereignty,
since the division gives an institutional assurance
to developing countries (even if they have
emerged as geopolitical powerhouses) not to be
strong-armed into taking targets beyond their ca-
pability (Stern 2014). 
Different from its international strategic posi-
tioning that shows both prudence and a particu-
lar kind of assertiveness, China’s domestic
climate action is comparatively proactive. Para-
doxically, China's emissions rose dramatically,
while significant progress was made in energy
saving and decoupling energy consumption and
economic growth. According to the World Bank,
China’s economy increased 18-fold in the period
from 1980 to 2010 while energy consumption in-
creased only 5-fold (World Bank 2014). Further,
China heavily invested in developing its renew-
able energy sectors, growing its forest stock, cut-
ting carbon intensity, establishing a pilot carbon
trading market, controlling air pollution, and
even capping the use of coal to name just a few
examples of recent climate action in China. We
also know that China considers peaking its total
GHG emissions somewhere in the course of the
next decade - but an official position is yet to be
taken (Meeting note 2014).
The crucial question for global climate politics is
to what extent the U-turn China made domesti-
cally when it comes to climate action can be ex-
tended to international climate cooperation. In
other words, will China take up more ambition
and leadership in the international arena, like it
did domestically during the past few years? 
-7-
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Recent statements seem to suggest a shift in
China’s international position as China “is ready
to work with the international community to ac-
tively tackle the grave challenge of climate
change”, as stated by Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli
at a major climate summit hosted by UN Secre-
tary General Ban Ki-Moon on September 23, 2014
in New York (Zhang 2014). This altering position
implies that a previous cornerstone of China's ex-
ternal policy, pronounced by its paramount
leader in the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping, as “maintain-
ing a low profile and never claiming leadership”
has come to an end when it comes to climate
change (Conrad 2012). 
At the Durban climate conference in December
2011, the parties agreed to develop a new inter-
national climate change agreement that will
cover all countries. The new agreement will be
adopted in 2015 at the Paris climate conference
and will be implemented from 2020. The starting
points of the agreement are the intended nation-
ally determined contributions (INDCs) of all par-
ties, which are due in the first quarter of 2015. In
the run-up to the Paris agreement, parties will
also negotiate on a draft text of the new agree-
ment in Lima in December 2014. The Lima con-
ference could therefore shed light on how parties
will handle some major pending issues like the
management of the "gap" between the intended
contributions and the contributions necessary to
keep global warming below 2°C, the system of
MRV, and how to move past institutional issues
such as Annex I versus Non-Annex I Parties
(Stern 2014). 
What the 2015 Paris agreement will look like, in
summary, highly depends on the position of
China in global climate politics, but also by other
major actors like the EU, the US and India. The
2015 Paris agreement will likely embrace a bot-
tom-up point of departure in which parties
pledge contributions to lower emissions, adapt
to climate impacts and agree on volumes and
mechanisms of financial transfer. This would
then be complemented by "top-down" mecha-
nisms, for instance, an obligatory schedule to re-
duce emissions, described by Todd D. Stern, the
US chief negotiator as a mechanism: "under
which there would be a legally binding obligation
to submit a 'schedule' for reducing emissions,
plus various legally binding provisions for ac-
counting, reporting, review, periodic updating of
the schedules, etc. But the content of the sched-
ule itself would not be legally binding at an in-
ternational level" (Stern 2014). Upfront pledges
made by parties themselves that take in to ac-
count capabilities could create more ownership
and willingness to abide by them than obliga-
tions set in top-down fashion. 
Hopefully, negotiating countries will be able to
overcome the issues mentioned in this article,
and work towards a global agreement in an at-
mosphere of mutual respect and understanding.
This is all the more relevant as the old Western-
dominated paradigm and geopolitical structure
is coming to an end, and new powers, with China
at its core, are determined to leave their mark on
global governance.
•REFERENCES•
Callahan, William. 2010. China: The Pessoptimist Na-
tion. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Carlson, Allen. 2005. Unifying China, Integrating with
the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform
Era. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Conrad, Björn. 2012. China in Copenhagen: Reconciling
the “Beijing Climate Revolution” and the “Copenhagen
Climate Obstinacy”. The China Quarterly, 210, 435-455.
Mcgrew, Anthony. 2008. Globalization and Global Poli-
tics. In The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduc-
tion to International Relations, ed. by J. Baylis, S. Smith,
& P. Owens. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 14-34.
Meeting note. 2014. 2014 Annual Review of Low-Carbon
Development in China Launch Event and The New Cli-
mate Economy Project Launch Event. Tsinghua Univer-
sity,  Beijing, 14 March.
Stern, Todd D. 2014. Seizing the Opportunity for
Progress on Climate. Yale University, New Haven CT,
14October. http://go.usa.gov/f45V, accessed 30 October
2014.
Wang, Dong. 2005. China’s Unequal Treaties: Narrating
National History. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Wang, Xuan. 1983. Permanent Sovereignty of States over
Natural Resources. In Selected Articles from Chinese
Yearbook of International Law, ed. by the Chinese Society
of International Law. Beijing: China Translation & Pub-
lishing Corporation, 125-146.
World Bank. 2014. Bringing China’s Energy Efficiency
Experience to the World: Knowledge Exchange with
Asian Countries. http://www.worldbank.org, accessed 29
October 2014.
Zhang, Gaoli. 2014. Build Consensus and Put it into Im-
plementation to Establish a Cooperative and Win-win
Global Climate Governance System. New York, 23 Sep-
tember. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn, accessed 30 October
2014.
Zhang, Z.. 2010. Copenhagen and Beyond: Reflections on
China’s Stance and Responses. East-West Center Working
Papers 111. Washington, DC and Honolulu: East-West
Center.
-8-
GLOBAL
The Future of World 
Population: An Explosive 
Dimension of Climate Change?
Prof. dr. Jan Van Bavel
Centre for Sociological Research
University of Leuven 
Introduction
The growth of the human population has raised concerns about the implications for the environment.
For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has incorporated differential sce-
narios of future population growth into its Emission Scenarios. Population growth has raised carbon
emissions and, hence, plays a role in global warming (Jiang & Hardee 2001). The global demographic
outlook therefore remains a critical issue in the scientific and political debates about climate change.
According to new projections by the United Nations, world population is unlikely to stop growing this
century. New estimates indicate that there is a 80% probability that world population will increase from
the current 7.2 billion people to between 9.6 and 12.3 billion in 2100. Much of the increase is going to
happen in Africa due to its high fertility rates and a slowdown in the pace of fertility decline (Gerland
et al. 2014).
Contemporary rates of world population growth have been unprecedentedly high in recent decades. The
number of 1 billion was exceeded for the first time in history at the beginning of the 19th century, after
about 200 000 years of history of anatomically modern humans. Growth strongly accelerated and the
number of 2 billion people was already surpassed around 1920. By 1960, another billion had been added,
in 40 instead of 120 years time. And it continued to go even faster: 4 billion by 1974, 5 billion by 1987, 6
billion by 1999 and 7 billion in 2011 (Figure 1). It is therefore fair to talk about a population “explosion”.
The explosion was and is not equally distributed around the globe. It got started on a small scale and
with a relatively moderate intensity in Europe and America, more or less between 1750 and 1950. From
1950 on, more substantial and intensive growth rates emerged in Asia, Latin America and Africa (Figure
2). Asia already represented over 55% of the world population in 1950 with its 1.4 billion citizens and by
the year 2010 this had increased to 4.2 billion people or 60%. Of those people, more than 1.3 billion live
in China and 1.2 billion in India, together accounting for more than one third of the world population. 
In the future, the proportion of Asians will decline and the proportion of Africans will increase. Africa
was populated by some 230 million people around 1950, or 9% of the world population. In 2010 there
were already more than 1 billion Africans or 15% of the world population. According to UN projections,
Africa will continue to grow at a spectacular rate up to 2.2 billion inhabitants in 2050 or 24% of the
world population. Population growth is particularly high in poor countries.
At the moment, more than 5.7 billion people, or more than 80% of humanity, are living in what the UN
categorise as a developing country. By 2050, that number is expected to increase to about 8 billion people
or 86% of the world population. Within this group of developing countries, the group of least developed
countries is growing most strongly: from 830 million now, up to an expected 1.7 billion in 2050. This
comprises very poor countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Niger or Togo in Africa; Afghanistan,
Bangladesh or Myanmar in Asia; and Haiti in the Caribbean. 
-9-
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• Figure 1: Historical growth of the world population since the year 1A.D.
Source: Livi-Bacci (2001, p.27) and UN World Population data
Scenarios for the future evolution of the size and age of the population mainly differ according to the
expectations about the further evolution of the birth rate. The evolution of the birth rate is in turn de-
pendent on two things: the trend of the total fertility rate (the average number of children per woman)
and population momentum (Van Bavel 2013). 
Fertility decline
Fertility is going down in all continents, but it’s going down particularly slowly in Africa. Figure 3 shows
the evolution per world region between 1950 and 2010, plus the projectedevolution until 2050. Asia and
Latin America have seen a similar decline in fertility: from 5.9 children per woman in 1950 to 2.5 at the
start of the 21st century. Europe and North America had already gone through the largest part of their
demographic transition by the 1950’s. Their fertility level has been below replacement levels for years.
Africa has indeed seen a global decrease of fertility, but the average number of children is still at an
alarmingly high level: the fertility merely decreased from 6.7 to 5.1 children per woman. 
• Figure 2: Evolution of the population size by continent, 1950-2050 
Source: UN World Population Prospects, the 2012 Revision; the data after 2010, with dotted line in the figure, are 
Median Variant projections
• Figure 3: Evolution of the total fertility rate by world region: 1950-2050
Source: UN World Population Prospects, the 2012 Revision; the data after 2010, with dotted lines, are medium 
variant projections
Child mortality, education, and family planning
From the vast literature about the causes of fertility decline, two factors emerge as crucial: child survival
and education. Considering child survival first: countries combining intensive birth control with very
high child mortality are simply non-existent: in countries with high child mortality, fertility is high, and
vice versa. This statistical correlation is very strongbecause the causal relation goes in both directions:
improved child survival stimulates fertilitydecline, and fertility decline leads to improved child survival
(Van Bavel 2013).
In the demographic transition from high to low birth and death rates, the decline in child mortality has
always preceded the decline in fertility. Men, women and families do not practice birth control if they
don’t have confidence in the survival chances of their children. Better health care is therefore essential,
and a lack of good health care is one of the reasons for a persistently high fertility in countries like
Niger. Improved education is the second crucial factor behind fertility decline. 
It may even be called the most important factor, not just because education is an important humanitar-
ian goal in itself (aside from its demographic effects), but also because with education one can kill two
birds with one stone. Education stimulates more birth control but also better child survival, which in
its turn will lead to better birth control. Hence, education yields multiplier effects. The influence of ed-
ucation on birth control has been demonstrated in a vast number of studies. 
Firstly, education enhances the motivation for birth control: if parents invest in the education of their
children, they are having fewer children. Secondly, education promotes a more forward-looking lifestyle:
it will lead people to think on a somewhat longer term, to think about tomorrow, next week and next
month, instead of living for the day. This attitude is necessary for effective birth control. 
Thirdly, education also increases the potential for effective contraception, because birth control doesn’t
just happen, especially not when efficient family planning facilities are hardly accessible or when there
are opposing family values (Van Bavel 2013). 
Education also enhances the capacities to practice birth control effectively. It is one thing to get people
motivated to practice birth control, but obtaining actual effective contraception is quite another matter.
Information concerning the efficient use of contraceptives and increasing the accessibility and afford-
ability of contraceptives can therefore play an important supportive role. There are an estimated 215
million women who would want to have contraception but don’t have the means (UNFPA, 2011).
-10-
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Population Momentum
Even if all the people would suddenly practice birth control much more than is currently considered
possible, the world population would still continue to grow for some time. This is the consequence of
population momentum, a notion that refers to the phenomenon of inertia, also familiar from physics.
Demographic growth is like a moving train: even when you turn off the engine, the movement will still
continue for a while. The power and direction of population momentum is dependent on the age struc-
ture of the population. Compare the population pyramids of Egypt and Germany (Figure 4). The one
for Egypt has a pyramidal shape indeed, but the one for Germany looks more like an onion. As a conse-
quence of high birth rates in the previous decades, the largest groups of Egyptians are to be found below
the age of thirty. The younger, the more voluminous the generation. Even if the current and future gen-
erations of Egyptians would limit their fertility strongly (as is indeed the case), the birth rate in Egypt
would still continue to rise for quite some time, just because year after year more and more potential
mothers and fathers reach the fertile ages. Egypt therefore clearly has a growth momentum. 
• Figure 4. Population pyramids of Egypt (left) and Germany (right)
Source:US Census Bureau, international database
Germany on the other hand has a negative or shrinking momentum: even if the younger generations of
Germans would have a larger number of children than the generation of their own parents, the birth
rate in Germany would still continue to decrease because fewer and fewer potential mothers and fathers
reach the fertile ages. The population momentum on a global scale is positive: even if fertility would
decrease overnight to around 2 children per woman, the world population would continue to grow with
40% (from 7 billion to 9.8 billion). Only the rich countries have a shrinking momentum, that is -3%. For
Europe the momentum is -7%. The population momentum for the poorest countries in the world is
+44%, that of Sub Saharan Africa +46% (Espenshade et al., 2011).
Implications of the population explosion
In the world population debate, the general concerns involve mainly three interconnected consequences 
of the population explosion: 1) the growing poverty in the world and famine; 2) the exhaustion and pol-
lution of natural resources essential to human survival; and 3) the migration pressure from the poor
South to the rich North.
Poverty and famine - Thomas Malthus saw an excessive population growth as an important cause of
poverty and famine. This Malthusian vision has been criticized a lot. Indeed, one must take the reverse
causal relation into account as well: poverty and the related social circumstances (like a lack of education
and good health care for children) are important causes of high population growth. Concerning famine:
the production of food has grown faster since 1960 than the world population has, so nowadays the
amount of food produced per person exceeds that which existed before the population explosion (Lam,
2011). The problem of famine isn’t as much an insufficient food production as it is a lack of fair distri-
bution (in addition to a lack of sustainable ways of production). 
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Often regions with famine have ecological conditions permitting sufficient production of food, provided
the necessary investments in human resources and technology are made. Famine is primarily a conse-
quence of unequal distribution of food rather than population growth, which in turn is caused by so-
cial-economic inequality, lack of democracy and (civil) war. Poverty and famine usually have mainly
political and institutional causes rather than demographic ones. The simplistic Malthusian vision, that
sees the population explosion as the root of all evil, therefore has to be corrected, as is done in Figure
5. Rapid population growth can indeed hinder economic development, but this is only part of the story.
As mentioned, poverty is also an underlying cause of rapid population growth. Social factors are at the
base of both poverty and population growth. It’s those social factors that require our intervention: via
investments in education and (reproductive) health care.
Environmental impact - The impact of the population explosion on the environment is unquestionably
high, but the size of the population represents only one aspect of this. In this regard it is useful to keep
in mind the simple I=PAT scheme: the ecological footprint or impact (I) on the environment can be re-
garded as the product of the size of the population (P), the prosperity or consumption level (A for afflu-
ence) and the technology used (T). The footprint I of a population of 1000 people is for example
dependent on how many of those people drive a car instead of a bike, and of the emission per car of the
vehicle fleet concerned.
The ecological footprint of the world population has increased tremendously in past decades and the
growth of the world population has obviously played an important role in this. But the other factors in
the I=PAT scheme have played a relatively bigger role than the demographic factor P. For example, the
considerable increase in the Chinese ecological footprint of the past decades is more a consequence of
the increased consumption of meat than of population growth (Liu et al., 2008). The carbon dioxide
emission of China grew by 82% between 1990 and 2003, while the population only increased by 11% in
that same period. A similar story exists for India: the population grew by less than 23% between 1990
and 2003, while the emission of carbon dioxide increased by more than 83% (Chakravarty et al., 2009).
The consumption of water and meat in the world is increasing more rapidly than the population. The
consumption of water per person is for example threefold higher in the US than in China (Hoekstra and
Chapagain, 2007). The African continent has at present the same number of inhabitants as Europe and
North America together, over 1 billion. But the total ecological footprint of Europeans and Americans is
many times higher than that of Africans (Ewing et al., 2010). Less than 18% of the world population is
responsible for over 50% of the global carbon dioxide emission (Chakravarty et al., 2009).
Migration flows - The population explosion has created an increasing migration pressure from the South
to the North – and there is also important migration within and between countries in the South. But
here as well the message is: the main responsibility doesn’t lie with the population growth but with eco-
nomic inequality. The primary motive for migration was and is economic disparity: people migrate from
regions with no or badly paid labour and a low standard of living to other regions, where one hopes to
find work and a higher standard of living. 
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• Figure 5: Connections between social factors, poverty and population growth
Given the permanent population growth and economic inequality, a further increasing migration pres-
sure is to be expected, irrespective of the national policies adopted. It is sometimes expected that eco-
nomic growth and increasing incomes in the South will slow down the migration pressure, but that
remains to be seen. After all, it isn’t usually the poorest citizens in developing countries that migrate to
rich countries. It is rather the affluent middle class in poor countries that have the means to send their
sons and daughters to the North – an investment that can raise a lot of money via remittances to the
families in the country of origin. There is after all a considerable cost attached to migration, in terms of
money and human capital. Not everyone can bear those costs: to migrate you need brains, guts and
money. For these reasons, economic development in poor countries is expected to lead to more migration
from poor to rich countries in the short run (De Haas, 2007).
7 Billion and counting: what needs to be done?
A world population that needed millennia before reaching the number of 1 billion people, but then
added some billions more after 1920 in less than a century: the social, cultural, economic and ecological
consequences of such an evolution are so complex that they can lead to fear and indifference at the
same time. What kind of constructive reaction is possible and productive in view of such an enormous
issue? First of all: we need to invest in education and health care in Africa and elsewhere, not just as a
humanitarian target per se but also because it will encourage the spread of birth control. Secondly, we
need to encourage and support the empowerment of women, not just via education but also via services
for reproductive health. This has triple desirable results for demographics: it will lead to more and more
effective birth control, which in itself has a positive effect on the survival of children, which in turn
again facilitates birth control. Thirdly: due to population momentum, the world population will certainly
continue to grow in absolute figures, even though the yearly growth rate in percentages is already on
the decline for several years. The biggest contribution we could make therefore, with an immediate
favourable impact for ourselves and the rest of the world, is to change our consumption pattern and
deal with the structural overconsumption of the world’s richest countries. 
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Scientists in parliament: can
they save us from disaster?
Massimiliano Simons
“To avoid receiving the candidates’ canned responses on these and other issues, 
I sometimes wish that a debate moderator would forgo a standard question about
immigration or jobs and instead ask the candidates to solve a simple puzzle, make
an elementary estimate, perform a basic calculation.”1
Introduction
Environmental themes are common subjects
nowadays in political party programs and politi-
cal discourse. While environmental topics were
still something for Green parties and scientists
only a few decades ago, now all parties have be-
come ‘green’. All parties are concerned with topics
such as climate change and there is great consen-
sus that it is a problem that desperately needs a
solution. 
However, at the same time, there is an apparent
dichotomy between the discourse of these parties,
its MP’s and the real policies they pursue. A study
in Portugal, for example, showed that “science is,
on the whole, highly regarded by Portuguese par-
liamentarians. […] Moreover, they express a de-
sire to privilege the role and participation of
scientists in developing science policy. These
opinions, however, stand in marked contrast to
many of the actual practices of the public policy-
making process in Portugal.” (Gonçalves 1996, p.
402) 
Although every politician is concerned with the
environment, in everyday (political) life, they are
too busy doing other things.
Scientists of all countries, unite!
So, if the parliamentarians do not really seem to
care about climate change, should scientists
themselves take matters into their own hands?
There are some advocates of this idea, for exam-
ple Mark Henderson. Henderson wrote a book in
2012 titled The Geek Manifesto: Why Science
Matters in which he argues that science should
play a crucial role in all policy making nowadays.
And since science matters so much, there should
be enough scientists in the parliament to deal
with these issues in the right way. But, neverthe-
less, the political reality remains completely dif-
ferent. When he wrote the book, of the UK's 650
MPs, 158 had a business background, 90 were po-
litical advisors or organisers, 86 were lawyers, 38
were journalists; and just three had science PhDs.
There is little proof that the situation improved
significantly since that date. But does the number
of scientists in parliament really matter? Why
would we need scientists in parliament? There is
in fact, very little genuine research done about
this topic. The discussion has, on the other hand,
mainly taking place in popular press and online.
The arguments given in favour of this opinion are
1 Paulos, J. A., ‘Why don't Americans Elect Scientists?,’ The New York Times, February 13, 2012.
2 Wright, Mark, 'On the Importance of having Scientists and Engineers in Parliament,' CaSE, March 17, 2010.
3 Ladyman, Stephen, 'Why do so few scientists get involved in politics?,' CaSE, March 19, 2010.
4 Clarkson, Paul, 'Where are the scientist politicians?,' physicsfocus online, March 4, 2014.
5 Hannan, Daniel, ‘Why all politicians should study some science,' The Telegraph, November 17, 2008.
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unable to understand what is going on. “[M]ore
and more things are simply beyond the grasp of
people who aren’t experts in that particular field.”2
We need well-trained specialists to do the job:
“Some of the key issues of the day can only
be understood with the help of science: cli
mate change, drug classification, medicine
safety, the impact of pollution, the conser
vation of fish stocks, risk analysis, the 
safety of nuclear power and the disposal of
radioactive waste, genetic modification, the
list goes on and on.”3
This has led to a whole range of concepts claiming
to bridge this gap: civic science, citizen science,
scientist-activist, citizen volunteer, citizen-activist,
etc. (Clark 2001). Some, however, even go further
and conclude that this not only requires us to take
advise from scientists, but scientists themselves
should become politicians. “We cannot hope that
the politicians who are non-scientists just ‘get it’.
I highly doubt that, after advising a politician, sci-
entists or engineers can trust that something in
which they’ve taken years to train is understood
in a handful of hours.”4
The environmental problems are scientific in na-
ture, and can be coped only by a scientific way of
thinking. Politicians tend to think in a legal way
and thus offer judicial solutions. “In the absence
of hard science, the vacuum is filled by fads, mod-
ish theories, things that people would like to be
true.” 5 Bill Foster on the other hand a particle
physicist who got elected in the USA, claims that
his background offers him unique insights into
politics: “he is continually thinking of new ways
to inject the rigour of science into the often messy
give and take that is the essence of politics.” 6 Sci-
entists are claimed to have a different mentality:
“all of the political incentives are about getting
elected two years from now. And, this causes us to
underinvest in things like basic scientific research
or early childhood education, where the economic
pickup is not in two years but 10 or 20 years.” 7
However scientists are underrepresented in par-
liament: it is mainly filled with economists, busi-
nessmen or lawyers more concerned with
economic growth than with the environment. Ju-
lian Huppert, himself an elected scientist, states
for example that "[w]e need to encourage people
from a diverse range of careers and backgrounds
to enter politics so that we have a mix which is
more representative of the people that we have
been elected to serve." 8 In the UK, there are some
scientists in the House of Lords, such as John
Krebs, Martin Rees or Robert Winston, but scien-
tists are hardly represented in the House of Com-
mons. Similar arguments are to be found in
different countries as well. 9 There have been at-
tempts and cases of these scientists-politicians. In
2006, for example, ‘Scientists and Engineers for
America’ (Sefora) was founded and in 2010 there
was a ‘science party’ in the UK. Both, however,
have disappeared by now.
Especially the American press seems to be con-
cerned with this issue, mainly due the high level
of scepticism in the United States with regard to
6 Bloudoff-Indelicato, Mollie, 'Physicist elected to Congress calls for more scientists-statesmen,' Nature, November 15, 2012.
7 Samles, Jonathan, 'From Particles to Politics: Congressman Foster discusses scientific background, political present during
Woodridge Rotary luncheon,' The Bugle, May 29, 2013.
8 Smith, Adam, 'Kicking down the doors: how to give scientific advice to governments,' The Guardian, May 11 2012.
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scientific topics such as climate change or evolu-
tion theory. This is often contrasted with other
countries in which scientists are more valued.
John Allen Paulos, for example, wrote in 2012 for
the New York Times after returning from Singa-
pore:
“China has even more scientists in key po
sitions in the government. President Hu 
Jintao was trained as a hydraulic engineer
and Premier Wen Jiabao as a geomechani
cal engineer. In fact, eight out of the nine
top government officials in China have sci
entific backgrounds. There is a scattering 
of scientist-politicians in high government
positions in other countries as well. Ger
man Chancellor Angela Merkel has a doc
torate in physical chemistry, and, going 
back a bit, Margaret Thatcher earned a de
gree in chemistry.” 10
These type of remarks are inspired by a somewhat
idealized image of scientists and a cynical view on
politicians: scientists seem to talk about the im-
portant stuff, like certain facts, while politicians
spur much drivel without any content. A famous
example of this is Neil de Grasse Tyson, an Amer-
ican astrophysicist and ‘science communicator’,
who stated in an interview in July 2014:
“So in the way that nuclear physicists stood up, I
think we should have climate scientists standing
up. With any issue that comes up, when we have
an emergent scientific truth, we can’t just sit back
and watch people debate a scientific truth — they
should be debating the politics that would follow
from the emergent scientific truth. That’s really
what the debates should be about, but they
haven’t been. And I’m disturbed by that, because
I don’t know what kind of democracy that is, if
you’re gonna run around cherry-picking the re-
sults of science, of emergent scientific consensus
because it conflicts with your philosophy and you
want to be responsible for the governance of the
nation, which involves thoughtful planning for the
future of our health and our wealth, the state of
the economy, all of the above.” 11
Why do we need scientists at all?
But are any of these arguments really sound?
Would climate change be solved if only we had
some more scientists as MP’s? It is ironic that a
call for more scientists and scientific expertise is
itself based on so little scientific evidence. For ex-
ample, it can be argued that scientists are not un-
derrepresented at all in parliament. Scientists are
in fact only a very small fraction of society, and so
there aren’t many scientists needed in parliament.
The real problem might not be the lack of science
in parliament, but the lack of science in society.
“So, contrary to what has been repeatedly argued
in the past, there isn't a glaring problem with a
lack of scientists involved in politics. There is,
however, another more distressing issue. Our
politicians' collective level of scientific knowledge
mirrors that of the general population.” 12 Politi-
cians might be scientific illiterate simply because
the population in general is.
Even if they would really be underrepresented, it
is doubtful that they would make the difference
these people expect them to make. In one of the
few studies that are conducted concerning this
topic, it is argued that scientific training does not
really make any difference at all. Taking the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill and Act
of 2008 in the UK as a case study, there was no ev-
idence found that scientists in parliament vote
any different from other members: they do not
vote more often on science-related bills, do not
favour more or less restrictions on scientific re-
search, nor do they are inclined to form part of a
minority faction within their own part (Goodwin
2014, p. 10-12). There are however two remarks to
be made here: firstly, it can be doubted whether
this really is a scientific topic, but instead was
about an ideological or at least a bio-ethical issue.
On the other hand, it is doubtful as well whether
any ‘pure’ scientific subjects exist and are dis-
cussed in parliament. Secondly, although scien-
tists might not vote differently on bills, they may
have an influence behind the scenes. Perhaps they
influence the process by agenda-setting prior to
the voting (Ibid., p. 19).
9 See for example Cliche, Jean-François, 'Seulement 13% des candidates ont une formation scientifique,' leSoleil, March 21,
2014 or Bekkers, Florian, 'Politiek heeft meer mensen met exacte achtergrond nodig,' Groenlinks, September 19, 2010.
10 Paulos, J. A., ‘Why don't Americans Elect Scientists?,’ The New York Times, February 13, 2012. 
11 Abrams, Lindsay, 'Neil deGrasse Tyson exclusive: “I don’t know what kind of democracy that is, if you’re gonna cherry-
pick...science because it conflicts with your philosophy”,' Salon, July 23, 2014.
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Nevertheless, the assimilation of science in poli-
tics might be problematic on its own. Science and
politics seem to have different goals: the purpose
of politics is framed as the ‘good life’ or economic
growth, while for science the goal seems to be the
accumulation of knowledge. These goals might be
incompatible in a way: “There is a crucial differ-
ence between the construction of science-based
policy advice and the construction of scientific
knowledge. Left to their own devices scientists sel-
dom formulate research questions and design re-
search projects in order to provide solutions for
policy problems.” (Jung et al. 2014, p. 7). Scientific
research is always framed in uncertainty or mar-
gins of error, things often lost in the translation
to traditional politics. A complete scientific con-
sensus is very rare, and so there are often scien-
tific dissidents, ready to be deployed for politic
purposes. Climate change is a very clear example
of this: even though climate change deniers are a
scientific minority, they are overrepresented in the
political debates, especially in the United States.
Additionally, claiming that science should serve
politics might result in the fact that every scien-
tific project is obliged to formulate concrete pur-
poses or show its utility for society. Science is
forced to have a direct ‘impact’ on society. 13 In-
stead of incorporating science in politics, this sim-
ply reduces science to politics.
Towards a contract with nature
Although, the technocratization of politics is pro-
posed by most above authors as the solution, it is,
on the contrary, part of the problem. It is doubtful
whether any real scientific and legitimate technoc-
racy can be established, let alone solve the prob-
lem of climate change. In fact, these optimists
presuppose in their argumentations two problem-
atic models of the relation between science and
politics: the decisionist model and the techno-
cratic model (Weingart 1999, p. 154).
According to the technocratic model politics
should or will be completely dependent on sci-
ence. Politics would in fact be nothing more than
‘good governance’ and the application of a neutral
procedure to implement whatever works accord-
ing to the objective facts. No such type of politics
has come into being, though these technocratic
dreams were already popular in the 60’s (and go
at least back to the work of Francis Bacon). On the
contrary, in the last decades there is a significant
loss of authority of science and of credibility of
politicians who base their policies on science
(Ibid, p. 151). 
The decisionist model claims that the relation be-
tween politics and science is equal to the relation
between objective knowledge and subjective val-
ues: scientists just offer the data, for example the
current status of the climate, and it is up to poli-
tics to make a decision based on their own (sub-
jective) values and perspectives. The idea that
‘science speaks truth to politics’ is, however, highly
problematic (Bader 2013). This model has some
highly implausible presuppositions: (a) the empir-
ical claim that political decision-making goes from
a political problem stated by the politician, via the
advice by the scientific expert and to the decision
made by the politician; (b) the claim that scientific
knowledge is completely value-free; (c) and the
presupposed neutrality of the experts (Weingart
1999, p. 154-155).
The fact that the relation between science and pol-
itics is far more complex has also recently been
advocated in the science and technology studies
(STS) and the sociology of scientific knowledge
(SSK) (see Shapin 1995). The general acceptance
of scientific theories is too often thought of as re-
sulting simply from the fact that these theories are
manifestly ‘true’. This is, however, not really any
explanation at all for the general consensus
reached about certain scientific theories. Explain-
ing why most people accept climate change and
global warming by referring to the simple fact that
‘it really is a true fact’ will hardly suffice. To do so
is to neglect the numerous social practices and
networks that had to be mobilized in the process.
It required a big network of people, statistical
data, environmental disasters, technological in-
struments and narratives about nature to spread
the belief in global warming.
As the French sociologist Bruno Latour points out,
we are however inclined to separate these net-
works in different, strictly separated domains:
facts and knowledge on one side, politics and
12 Pomeroy, Ross, 'Politicians Ignorant of Science Because We Are,' Real Clear Science, August 23, 2012.
13 Smith, Adam, 'Making an impact: when science and politics collide,' The Guardian, June 1, 2012.
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social practices on the other. The humans versus
the nonhumans. 
We claim that this is what separated us from other
civilizations and made us ‘modern’: we are sepa-
rated from ‘primitive’ tribes and medieval war-
lords by a ‘Great Divide’ (Latour 1993, p. 12). While
these tribes seem to mix up politics and nature, by
believing in deities ruling over the realms of na-
ture, we have seen the light and separated them:
our knowledge about nature is completely de-
tached from all cultural and social processes; our
politics is aimed at man alone, and does not rely
on these gods of nature. So we westerners claim
and so the decisionist and technocratic model pre-
suppose. The assertion that climate change should
be coped simply by installing more scientists in
parliament, because they have the pure facts, pre-
supposes this separation.
But is there really such a separation? Ironically,
climate change might be the perfect example of
why this is not the case. Is global warming a pure
natural process to be discussed by science and
facts, a process of nonhuman things? Or is it a so-
cial thing, something made solely by man? It
seems to be neither, but instead it is a mix of both.
Neither natural nor social, but a hybrid form (La-
tour, p. 50). Cases such as global warming, ozone
hole, deforestation, cancer, overpopulation, Cher-
nobyl, etc. are not clear-cut natural or social, but
always a bit of both. In the current threats we are
faced with, the distinction has become hard to
make: drought and climate change seem to play a
crucial role in the Syrian Uprising (De Châtel
2014) while climate change models need to incor-
porate the behaviour of the masses (Palmer &
Smith 2014).
Yet, we are still inclined to keep them discon-
nected and that is exactly the problem with the
whole debate on climate change as well as why the
call for more scientists in parliament is miscon-
ceived. It is striking that in our political and social
thinking we only incorporate the social, but not
nature. It is in this context that the French thinker
Michel Serres calls up for rewriting our contrat so-
cial into a contrat naturel (Serres 1995). When so-
cial scientists, lawyers or politicians speak about
unemployment, social insurance, the war on drugs
or economic growth they hardly speak about the
natural processes involved in these matters. 
These processes seem to take place in a void, com-
pletely ignoring the environment in which it takes
place. 
Those who decide, who make the political deci-
sions do this in a way completely separated from
every aspect of nature:they deal only in language,
in laws, in social norms and political values (Ibid.,
pp. 28-29). 
Sure, politicians do talk about global warming,
acid rains or floods. But only as separated debates,
somehow distinct. The modern separation be-
tween the social and the natural is re-enacted once
again. If these environmental problems are incor-
porated at all, they are translated into economic
challenges: we do not talk about fundamental con-
flicts or crises, but about cooperation problems:
we can in a way buy ourselves out of global warm-
ing by adjusting our personal behaviour. For ex-
ample by emissions trading, i.e. we put a price on
the right to emit an amount of CO2, but by this we
neglect the political aspects of the problem alto-
gether. As Kenis & Lievens (2014) state:
“The CO2 emitted by a steel factory is rendered
equal to that emitted by a hospital, by a wild camel
in the remote regions of Australia, or by a tree
being cut down. The CO2 emission saved by build-
ing more efficient coal-fired power stations is
equalised with that saved by building wind mills.
The fact that the latter is a step on the pathway to
a sustainable energy system while the former re-
mains within the fossil fuel model is no longer of
any account. This equalisation prevents people
from making conscious political choices or choos-
ing priorities. The foregoing seems to lead to an
easy conclusion: if we want to repoliticise environ-
mental issues, not only ‘nature’ but also every en-
mity and conflict should be ‘internalised’ again.”
(p. 541)
© Isaac Cordal
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We should internalise these aspects, to solve global
warming, by working towards a fundamental new
contract, which breaks with this distinction be-
tween politics and nature. As Serres puts it, we
need a natural contract: “I mean by natural con-
tract above all the precisely metaphysical recogni-
tion, by each collectivity, that it lives and works in
the same global world as all the others” (Serres
1995, p. 46). Environmental problems should not
be translated to economic recalculations, but
should be incorporated into politics as the hybrid
problems that they are: mixes of different social
aspects, perspectives on nature, technological de-
vices, et cetera. It is not about determining the
natural facts and afterwards starting to think
about social solutions, but about establishing
these ‘facts’ for what they really are: natural ele-
ments always already linked with human ele-
ments, economic structures or political relations.
So do we need more exact scientists in parlia-
ment? Perhaps, but not because they somehow
miraculously know the ‘truth’ about it all, but be-
cause they might offer us different ways of think-
ing: in a way they are the ones who are somehow
more used to work with networks in which the
‘natural things’ dominate. We don’t need them be-
cause they have some special method which en-
sures them to be always correct, they hardly ever
are, but because they have an ethos, which might
be beneficial: they have a different ‘ethic of cogni-
tion’ (Gellner 1979) which incites them to speak
about the natural aspects of things to a further ex-
tent than other groups are. In this sense, we might
not need a parliament of scientists, but perhaps a
parliament of things (Latour 1993, p. 142).
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De nieuwe klimaatbeweging
Johan Malcorps
lid van de schrijversgemeenschap van Oikos,
Denktank voor sociaal-ecologische verandering
(www.oikos.be).
Van 30 november tot 11 december 2015 vindt in Parijs COP 21 plaats: daar zouden ein-
delijk definitieve afspraken om de klimaatverandering tegen te gaan gemaakt moeten
worden. Na de dramatische mislukking van de 2009 klimaattop te Kopenhagen en veel
tussentops de voorbije jaren die vooral stilstand opleverden, is dit voor de meeste waar-
nemers de top van de laatste kans. VN- secretaris-generaal Ban Ki-Moon riep op 23
september 2014 de wereldleiders bijeen in New York met de dringende vraag om deze
kans niet te verspelen. Er werden nieuwe beloftes gedaan want volgend jaar is het me-
nens. Wereldwijd komt een nooit geziene mobilisatie op gang en schudden burgers on-
verschilligheid en lethargie van zich af.
Op zondag 21 september 2014 stapten zo’n
400.000 mensen door de straten van New York.
Zoals op voorhand aangekondigd ging het om de
grootste klimaatbetoging ooit, in de VS, maar ook
daarbuiten. Bovendien bleef de ‘People’s Climate
March’ van 21/9/2014 niet beperkt tot New York
alleen. In verschillende steden zoals Londen,
Berlijn, Parijs, Melbourne, maar ook Delhi en Bo-
gota, namen wereldwijd zo’n 675.000 mensen in
totaal deel aan grote manifestaties, betogingen
en happenings.
Disruption
Opvallend aan deze megabetogingen was de
grote rol die de sociale media speelden in het op
straat krijgen van zo veel mensen wereldwijd. De
groene internetsite AVAAZ stond in voor een
groot deel van de mobilisatie. De documentaire
film “Disruption”  laat zien hoe de betoging werd
voorbereid. En tegelijk hoe deze nieuwe klimaat-
beweging van onderop vorm kreeg. Dit is een be-
weging die voortkomt uit verontwaardiging
omdat uitgerekend in de rijke VS de sociaal
zwakste en gekleurde Amerikanen het meest
kwetsbaar bleken voor milieurampen en op
cynische manier door de overheid in de steek
gelaten werden. Maar tegelijk is het een 
beweging die hoop biedt, een nieuwe strijdbare
sociale beweging, die met de voeten in de mod-
der, zelf mee helpt aan de heropbouw van wijken
na de klimaatverwoesting, opkomt voor 100%
duurzame energie en voor groene jobs. 
Maar een beweging die ook bewust de con-
frontatie aangaat, radicaal aanstuurt op het
stopzetten van olie- en gasboringen, van de aan-
leg van pijpleidingen en de bouw van kolenter-
minals. Daarbij gaat het in wezen niet meer om
een milieustrijd, maar om een harde schreeuw
om rechtvaardigheid: de zogenaamde “climate
justice”. De film “Disruption” toont hoe plaat-
selijk mensen gemobiliseerd worden door activis-
ten van CJA (Climate Justice Alliance):
Afrikaanse Amerikanen, Latino’s, indianenge-
meenschappen, Aziaten en Micronesiërs, blanke
arbeiders, vakbonden, jeugdgroepen, vrouwen-
en moedergroepen, kerkelijke organisaties zoals
Greenfaith.
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Deze maken zich allemaal op om een verbeten
strijd te gaan voeren, “the fight of our lives”. “This
is not just about the environment, it’s about the
community, it’s about public health, it’s about
jobs, it’s about justice,” zegt Eddie Bautista van
CJA New York. “Het gaat niet om ijsberen of ijss-
chotsen, maar om je broer die astma heeft.”
No Time
De wortels van de nieuwe milieu- en klimaatbe-
weging verzetten zich tegen de exploitatie van
niet-conventionele brandstoffen in de VS en
Canada. De laatste jaren schoten actiecomités als
paddenstoelen uit de grond. Tegen teerzandgin-
ningen, fracking, het aftoppen van bergen voor
mijnbouw, de aanleg van pijpleidingen voor het
vervoer van zware olie, de doortocht van mam-
moettransporten met supertrucks, de aanleg van
exportterminals of de opzet van diepzeeboringen.
Het gaat overigens niet enkel om een Noord-
Amerikaans verschijnsel. De plaatselijke ac-
tiegroepen maken deel uit van een wereldwijde
verzetsbeweging tegen de olie- en gasindustrie.
Naomi Klein beschrijft de beweging in haar laat-
ste boek ‘No Time’.ii
De wereldwijde frontzone van verzet werd boven
de doopvont gehouden en kreeg de naam
‘Blockadia. Dit omdat het steeds gaat om het af-
blokken van nieuwe vormen van boringen en ex-
ploitaties van de fossiele-brandstofindustrie.
Deze industrie is steeds wanhopiger op zoek naar
nieuwe gas- en olievoorraden en daarbij steeds
minder scrupules aan de dag legt. Zelfs als voor
het winnen van schaliegas of teerzandolie kost-
bare natuurgebieden opgeofferd moeten worden, 
of als de exploitatie een gevaar inhoudt voor wa-
tervoorraden, milieu, gezondheid, zelfs als de
ontginning peperduur blijkt, als de energie-op-
brengst misschien zelfs lager uitvalt dan de en-
ergiekost voor de exploitatie, drijft men door. Het
gaat om een stormloop op nieuwe koolstof, op ex-
treme energie. Voor de olie- en gasindustrie is het
aanboren van de nieuwe voorraden een kwestie
van leven of dood. Toegeven dat de voorraden
eindig zijn is zo veel als het eigen doodvonnis
tekenen. Dit verklaart de verbeten inzet om toch
tal van maagdelijke terreinen in te palmen, strijd
te voeren met de plaatselijke bevolking in nieuwe
‘offerzones’, om grondrechten te negeren van in-
heemse volkeren, om indien nodig geweld te ge-
bruiken en politici zwaar onder druk te zetten.
Voor het vervoer van de nieuwe olie zijn echter
nieuwe megaprojecten nodig. De Keystone XL –
pijpleiding die de teerzandontginningen in Al-
berta (Canada) over 3.500 kilometer moet
verbinden met raffinaderijen in Houston (Texas)
kan dit illustreren. 
Eigen aan deze nieuwe protestbeweging is dat ze
niet meer onderhandelt, niet opnieuw gaat
zoeken naar compromissen. Waarom zouden ze
goed land opofferen aan nieuwe boringen, als de
wetenschap zegt dat 80% van alle fossiele brand-
stoffen onder de grond moet blijven, indien we
willen vermijden dat de klimaatverandering to-
taal onbeheersbaar wordt? “Leave the oil in the
soil, the coal In the hole, the tar sands in the
land” is het nieuwe mantra. Solidariteit over de
grenzen heen wordt doodgewoon: “ni ici, ni
ailleurs”, zoals de Franse anti-frack-activisten
zeggen. De tijd van NIMBY (Not In My Backyard)
is ver heen.
“This is not just about the environment, it’s about the community,
it’s about public health, it’s about jobs, it’s about justice”
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Tijd voor een nieuwe radicale
massabeweging
Het is dus tijd voor een nieuwe massabeweging.
Wereldwijd. Meer zelfs, die is al volop bezig. De
historicus van de Amerikaanse arbeidersbewe-
ging Jeremy Brecher spreekt van een rebellie, een
volksopstand. iii Mensen kiezen massaal voor een
nieuwe strategie in de strijd tegen Big Oil, na de-
cennia van halfhartig beleid van de overheid. Als-
ook na het falen van ‘Big Green’, de klassieke
milieuverenigingen. Mensen willen het recht in
eigen handen nemen om hun toekomst en die
van hun kinderen veilig te stellen. De vakbonden
moeten daarin het voortouw nemen. In geen
geval mogen ze zich laten misbruiken door Big
Oil om het handvol jobs te verdedigen dat tot
stand kan komen bij het boren naar olie of gas
of het aanleggen van pijplijnen. 
Die nieuwe basisbeweging heeft ook nood aan
nieuwe keuzes, een duidelijk afgelijnd pro-
gramma waar duizenden, zo niet miljoenen men-
sen zich kunnen achter scharen wereldwijd.
Geen technisch amalgaam, geen voorgekauwd
compromis dat het maximaal haalbare voorop-
stelt, maar klare taal, doelstellingen die zeggen
waar het op staat, die urgentie vertalen in con-
crete actie, die terug hoop bieden en perspectief
op redding.
Als we willen vermijden dat ons klimaat totaal
ontspoort, moeten we vasthouden aan een maxi-
male opwarming van 2°C. Dat is de belangrijkste
aanbeveling van de 
klimaatrapporten van het Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In dat geval
mogen we tussen 2000 en 2050 niet meer dan
886 Gigaton C02 uitstoten. iv Maar het CO2-emis-
sie-potentieel van alle op dit ogenblik gekende
reserves aan fossiele brandstoffen (steenkool, olie
en gas, in handen van privémaatschappijen en
staten) bedraagt maar liefst 2.795 Gigaton CO2.
Dat is zo goed als het vijfvoudige. Om voor 80%
zeker te zijn dat de 2°C grens gerespecteerd
wordt, moet 80% van deze fossiele reserves in de
grond blijven.
Dat wil zeggen dat de belangen van de fossiele
brandstof-industrie en die van de mensheid on-
verzoenbaar zijn geworden. Het wordt een we-
reldwijde strijd op leven en dood. De grote
energiemaatschappijen en autoritaire regimes
die voor hun voortbestaan geheel afhankelijk zijn
van de inkomsten van fossiele brandstoffen, hou-
den de internationale politiek en economie in
een wurggreep. Hun belangen zijn sterk verbon-
den met die van de grote banken.
Door het schaarser worden van conventionele
bronnen van fossiele brandstoffen, is het exploi-
teren van niet-conventionele bronnen (bijv. teer-
zand- en schalie-olie, schaliegas) en het aanboren
van nieuwe locaties (bijv. aan de Noordpool, diep
onder zee) voor hen veel lucratiever geworden.
Maar de kosten voor milieu en klimaat zijn im-
mens. Terwijl het enkel zorgt voor uitstel van exe-
cutie.
80% van de fossiele brandstoffen
moet in de grond blijven
i Zie : http://watchdisruption.com/
ii Naomi Klein, No Time. Verander nu voor het klimaat alles verandert, De Geus, Breda, 2014
iii Jeremy Brecher, “Climate Insurgency : A Strategy Against Doom”, Paradigm Publishers, te verschijnen in 2015
iv Carbon Tracker Initiative, “Unburnable Carbon”, maart 2012 
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Drie concrete acties dienen zich aan: het stopzetten
van alle subsidies van overheden aan fossiele brand-
stoffen, een verbod op het gebruik van niet-conventi-
onele brandstoffen (bijv. via de Europese richtlijn over
de kwaliteit van de brandstoffen) en het schrappen
van alle investeringen in de fossiele brandstof-indus-
trie.
Vooral dat laatste spreekt tot de verbeelding. Het gaat
om de zogenaamde desinvesteringsbeweging, die
startte aan Amerikaanse universiteiten. Recent kon-
digde ook de filantropische stichting van de Rockefel-
ler-familie aan dat ze hun investeringen in fossiele
brandstoffen zullen schrappen. Verenigingen die op-
komen voor eerlijk investeren zoals bij ons FAIRFIN
in België verdedigen al langere tijd acties in deze zin.
Het is aan individuele burgers, de milieubeweging,
vakbonden, pensioenfondsen, maar ook aan overhe-
den om zich te richten tot banken en financiële
instellingen met de eis om niet langer te investeren in
vervuilende en klimaatbedriegende activiteiten. Maar
hoe zit het met de Vlaamse universiteiten?
Nood  a a n  e e n  mond i a a l  k l i -
maa t  / e n e r g i e p a k k e t
Er moeten duidelijke objectieven komen voor de ver-
mindering van broeikasgassen wereldwijd. 
Europa moet daarbij een voorlopersrol blijven spelen
en niet zwichten voor de olielobby. Zo dringen de Eu-
ropese milieubewegingen bijv. aan op een verminde-
ring van de Europese uitstoot van broeikasgassen met
55% tegen 2030, met 95% tegen 2050. Dat zijn de
grootte-ordes die nodig zijn als we het klimaatpro-
bleem echt ernstig nemen. Alsook voor ambitieuze
bindende doelstellingen voor energiebesparing en
hernieuwbare energie. Dan kan Europa op de klimaat-
toppen van Lima eind dit jaar en Parijs (eind volgend
jaar) wederom de lead nemen in plaats van het initia-
tief over te laten aan de VS en de BRICS-landen. 
Er wordt best toegewerkt naar een internationaal bin-
dend klimaatakkoord. Maar wellicht zit dat er niet in
en zullen we stranden op een systeem van vrijwillige
overeenkomsten. Dat hoeft niet het einde te zijn, als
alle landen ieder voor zich de lat hoog genoeg leggen.
Met de recente beslissing van president Obama om de
uitstoot van energiecentrales fors aan banden te leg-
gen en met de beslissing van China om ook werk te
maken van een koolstofarme economie, is er voor het
eerst weer hoop binnen de internationale klimaatkrin-
gen. China heeft overigens in de periode 2001-2010
voor meer dan 80 gigawatt aan kolencentrales geslo-
ten en ook de investeringen in nieuwe kolencentrales
zouden aanzienlijk teruglopen.
De vervuiler moet betalen 
Emissieplafonds (caps) en doelstellingen voor ener-
giebesparingen en hernieuwbare energie zullen niet
snel genoeg tot resultaten leiden, als de prijs voor
koolstof (voor CO2) niet fors verhoogd wordt. De ver-
vuiler moet betalen. In de eerste plaats de fossiele
brandstof-industrie zelf. Want nu zitten we in de cy-
nische situatie dat naarmate olie schaarser wordt, de
olieprijzen stijgen en de oliemultinationals meer win-
sten boeken waardoor er met meer geld meer druk
uitgeoefend kan worden. De winst die de vijf grootste
oliemaatschappijen boekten tussen 2001 en 2010 be-
droeg maar liefst 900 miljard dollar. 
Ook andere sectoren die blijven kiezen voor fossiele
brandstoffen en dralen met de transitie naar koolsto-
farme oplossingen, moeten meebetalen. 
De vraag is hoe deze vervuilingskosten het best wor-
den aangerekend? Kan het Europees stelsel van de
CO2-emissiehandel in die mate hervormd worden, dat
het een performant systeem wordt om de uitstoot van
broeikasgassen voldoende sterk terug te dringen?
Velen betwijfelen dit. 
Het hele ETS-systeem is nu tot een ongelooflijke koe-
handel verworden. Wat ons onvermijdelijk confron-
teert met de vraag ten gronde: zal een mechanisme
van afkopen en uitruilen, of zeg maar ‘sjacheren’ met
vervuilingsrechten, niet altijd tot ongewenste effecten
of zelfs een totale mislukking leiden? Is een dergelijk
verregaand vertrouwen in marktmechanismen niet
geheel misplaatst? De prijs van CO2 op de CO2-markt
schommelt momenteel rond de 4€. Om echt werkbaar
te zijn zou een prijs van 30 € nodig zijn.
Energiespecialist Aviel Verbruggen zegt al jaren dat
een CO2/energie-taks zeel simpeler en efficiënter kan
zijn.v Een CO2/energie-taks kan perfect gecombineerd
worden met straffe "caps". De opbrengst van zo een
CO2/energietaks kan deels gebruikt worden om de ar-
beidskosten te verminderen in de ontwikkelde landen.
Maar een groot deel, zo niet het grootste deel, zal moe-
ten gaan naar de afbouw van onze uitstaande ecolo-
gische schulden aan het Zuiden. 
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O N D E R H A N D E L  I N T E R -
N AT I O N A A L ,  M A A R  H A N -
D E L  V O O R A L  L O K A A L
De 21ste eeuw wordt de eeuw van de steden. 
Het grootste deel van de wereldbevolking leeft in
steden en de grote metropolen kunnen het ver-
schil maken. Als zij kiezen voor een duurzame
transitie trekken ze de rest mee. Zo is er de in-
ternationale vereniging van lokale besturen,
ICLEI (Local Governments for Sustainability) die
maar liefst 1200 lokale steden en regio’s groe-
peert (met een grote vertegenwoordiging van ste-
den en regio’s uit de VS en Australië). Daarnaast
is er de Europese samenwerking van steden die
de Burgemeestersconvenant ondertekenden. 
Het actieprogramma Agenda 21 dat het licht zag
op de Rio-conferentie in 1992 blijft bovendien lo-
kale besturen inspireren. 
Benjamin Barber verwacht geen heil meer van de
natiestaten of van een multilaterale diplomatie
op maat van natiestaten . Staten zoals de VS,
China, India, Australië hebben zich helemaal in-
gegraven en klampen zich vast aan hun natio-
nale soevereiniteit. Zij zijn “disfunctioneel in hun
onvermogen om grensoverschrijdend samen te 
werken”. Burgemeesters in grote steden zijn niet
gebonden door dat soort van nationale ideologie.
Zij handelen pragmatisch, zij zoeken naar oplos-
singen. Zij kunnen beter inspelen op de nieuwe
mondigheid van burgers. Steden staan dan ook
voor de uitdaging om zich te versterken tegen de
gevolgen van de klimaatverandering. Zij nemen
ook het voortouw in de strijd voor maatregelen
die de effecten van de opwarming alsnog kunnen
tegengaan. Overigens, 80% van de broeikasgas-
emissies wordt uitgestoten door steden. Het is
dan ook in de steden dat de oplossingen gevon-
den moeten worden. 
In eigen land geven steden als Gent, Leuven, Me-
chelen het voorbeeld, naast de provincies Lim-
burg en Vlaams-Brabant. Zij gaan voor een
koolstofarme toekomst, voor een klimaatneutrale
stad of provincie. Maar ze hebben nog een hele
weg te gaan. Buitenlandse steden zoals Kopen-
hagen, Stockholm, Hamburg, Freiburg, Portland
tonen aan wat mogelijk is als men over een lan-
gere periode aangehouden duurzame keuzes
maakt. 
Energieproductie in 
gemeenschapsbeheer
Tegenover de agressieve aanspraken van de fos-
siele brandstof-industrie die vecht voor haar
overleven door het aanslaan van steeds nieuwe
gronden, staat de onmiskenbare opmars van een
totaal ander model: dat van gedecentraliseerde
en distributieve energieproductie. Zon, wind, wa-
terkracht zijn gemeenschappelijke goederen
waar iedereen gebruik kan van maken. Door de
snelle ontwikkeling van duurzame technologieën
kan dit plaats vinden tegen steeds kleinere kos-
ten. Private burgers worden zelf eigenaar van
zonnepanelen of participeren in windturbines of
andere vormen van duurzame productie op lo-
kaal niveau. Dat laatste kan een bewuste keuze
worden, stelt een nieuw manifest van het Vlaams
Transitienetwerk Middenveld: “We kunnen ook
kiezen voor publieke en/of collectieve eigendom
van hernieuwbare energie installaties”. De au-
teurs van het manifest tonen dat in Duitsland de
eigendom van de installaties van duurzame ener-
gie al ruim verspreid zit over maatschappelijke
groepen: privépersonen en coöperatieven bezit-
ten 40% van de installaties. 
v Zie o.m. Aviel Verbruggen, De Ware Energiefactuur, Houtekiet, 2008
De grote vier energieproducenten (EON, RWE,
EnBW en Vatenfall) amper 7%. Voor de fossiele
elektriciteitsproductie is het beeld totaal anders:
daar bezitten de grote vier maatschappijen 80%
van de productie. In de toekomst kunnen steden
en gemeenten terug een grotere rol gaan spelen
in de lokale energietransitie. Gemeentelijke ener-
gieprojecten die echt kiezen voor plaatselijke pro-
ductie van groene energie (in plaats van de
aankoop van groene stroom uit het buitenland)
of de (her)communalisatie van energieproductie,
plaatselijke netwerken en opslagsystemen kun-
nen complementair zijn met projecten in ge-
meenschappelijk beheer, energie als een nieuwe
vorm van commons.
Veel initiatieven bloeien spontaan op. Maar aan
de andere kant gaan we uit van enige urgentie.
Het organiseren van de transitie door gemeenten
met burgers en groepen van onderop, maar ook
met ambtenaren, middenveldverenigingen en po-
litici die een kader creëren dat dit ook echt mo-
gelijk maakt binnen een vooropgestelde tijd, is
dan wellicht de beste werkvorm. De beweging
‘Transition Towns’ van Rob Hopkins toont aan
wat verandering van onderop vermag, waarbij
burgers het voortouw nemen en lokale besturen
trachten te overtuigen. Anderzijds is ook een
meer gestuurde transitie met een actieve inbreng
van lokale en regionale overheden een reële mo-
gelijkheid. Dat bewijst Jan Rotmans in concrete
transitieprojecten in Nederland of bewijzen tran-
sitie-arena’s in Vlaanderen zoals DUWOBO en
PLAN C.
Een nieuwe beweging maar nu
mét politieke agenda
De nieuwe transitiebeweging voor de energiesec-
tor, en bij uitbreiding voor onze hele economie
en samenleving, groeit van onderop en wordt
mee aangestuurd door delen van de overheid en
het middenveld. Maar de lat ligt hoog en het zou
wel erg naïef zijn om te denken dat een dergelijke
transitie (revolutie?) heel smooth, gemoedelijk
kan verlopen, zonder op tegenstand te stoten.
Het tegendeel is duidelijk waar. Transitie is oor-
log. Gevestigde machtsgroepen gaan keihard in
het verweer. De fossiele industrie heeft alles te
verliezen en kan zich geen vergelijk permitteren.
De echte transitie zal moeten worden afgedwon-
gen worden. Niet enkel in ideeënlabs en work-
shops, maar ook op straat, via acties, door
geldstromen te veranderen. 
Het goede nieuws is dat deze acties op gang
komen. En nog beter nieuws is dat we deze acties
nu ook een focus kunnen mee geven. Zodat ze
niet steriel blijven zoals helaas veel acties van Oc-
cupy, Indignados, etc. Die zorgden voor broodno-
dige sensibilisering. Maar die zo makkelijk
konden gerecupereerd worden. Het is aan de
nieuwe klimaatbeweging om tot op het bot te
gaan. Om actief aan politiek te doen. En niet te
stoppen tot de olie effectief onder de grond blijft. 
Tot de laatste boor stil valt en de laatste oliepomp
stopt met knikken.
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The new green
economy: a myth?
An interview with Matthias Lievens, political philosopher and
co-author of the book ‘De mythe van de groene economie’
Tim Christiaens
Massimiliano Simons
In environmental discussions the idea of a ‘green
economy’ is very present nowadays, but what
does it really mean? And can it really be a solu-
tion? In 2012 Matthias Lievens, political philoso-
pher, and Anneleen Kenis, geographer working
on human ecology and ecological citizenship,
wrote a book together ‘De mythe van de groene
economie’. In this book they debunk the concept
of ‘green economy’ as a myth, doomed to fail as a
solution for climate change. The book caused pub-
lic debate in Belgium and will soon be translated
into English as ‘The Limits of the Green Economy
From re-inventing capitalism to re-politicising
the present’, scheduled for April 2015 by Rout-
ledge. To give a glimpse of the interesting ideas
in the book, Global had to opportunity to inter-
view one of its authors, Matthias Lievens.
•You wrote the book together with Anneleen
Kenis, who works at the research groups of
geography and bioeconomics in Leuven,
while you are a philosopher. How did you
two meet and decided to wrote this book to-
gether?
LIEVENS: Actually, when we first wrote the
Dutch version of the book we didn’t see it as an
academicproject, but rather as a socially engaged
project. We were both active members of the cli-
mate justice movements, especially around the
summit in Copenhagen in 2009. We decided to
write the book shortly after this summit. The ob-
jective was to make a political intervention in an
on-going debate. A kind of shift was taking place
in the environmental movement, a repositioning.
We wanted to intervene in this process.
Of course, while writing this book, we also
drew on our respective academic specialisations.
Anneleen Kenis is working in the field of political
ecology, whereby she especially studies recent cli-
mate movements. I contributed to our common
reflection on the basis of critical social and polit-
ical theories which I am researching. 
I t is common for academics to first write a
scholarly book and then write a popular version
of it. For us it was a bit the opposite: we wrote
this political-popular book and it had quite some
success. It triggered a lot of debate. Our col-
leagues at the university convinced us that our
argument was also of academic interest, and we
therefore decided to develop our ideas in a more
theoretically sound, rigorous and refined way.
That is why we started to rewrite the book. The
English version is not really a translation, but ac-
tually a different book. The general thrust of the
argument is the same, but the book is theoreti-
cally more precisely elaborated. Furthermore, the
debates we have had in Flanders and the Nether-
lands in the meantime allowed us to clarify some
issues. For example, the English book contains a
more detailed discussion of what the ‘green econ-
omy’ is and what it is not. We also thoroughly up-
dated the book. It will be published with
Routledge next year actually [April 2015].
People-planet-profit
•So let us turn back to the book. What is the
green economy exactly and why is it a myth?
LIEVENS: The notion of the green economy is
still quite vague. Five to ten years ago nobody
spoke about it except for some academics or
NGOs. It is actually a notion that emerged soon
after the Copenhagen summit in 2009, but the
germs were already there. It is a kind of para-
digm shift in thinking about environmentalism
and environmental politics. 
One of the key features of that paradigm
shift is an increasing reliance on the market. For
a long time we thought that the environmental
crisis is a fundamental challenge for the market
society, economic growth, industrialism, etc. The
paradigm shift states: “No, both can be recon-
ciled. Even more: tackling climate change can be-
come an economic opportunity.” The ecological
crisis is presented as an economic opportunity.
Especially after the financial crisis, this is a mes-
sage that many people like to hear. 
But what we observe is that a kind of
means-ends reversal is taking place. Doing some-
thing about ecology or about climate change be-
comes a means for the actual goal, namely to
realise growth, profit, etc. As such, this paradigm
shift is interesting, it is fascinating to see how in-
ternational institutions, lobby groups and big
multinationals discover the ecological question,
try to work on it and try to develop their own re-
sponse to it. The claim is that we can reconcile
three goals: we can realize climate stabilisation,
economic growth and social equity or social jus-
tice at once. This is the typical ‘people-planet-
profit’ idea. 
That story sounds nice, it is attractive. If
it would work, we should start with it immedi-
ately! But it is a story, and we think it is a myth,
because in actual practice we see that there are
difficult trade-offs to be made: choices between
economic growth or climate stabilisation, be-
tween economic growth and social justice. 
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We cannot realize all three at the same time. We
have to make priorities. What we see in current
green economy projects is that priority is given
to economic growth and new business opportu-
nities, at the cost of social equity and often at the
cost of sustainability. Many proposals that have
been made in the framework of the green econ-
omy project are actually not so sustainable at all.
We think about agrofuels, emission trading, et
cetera. That is why we started to ask a number
of critical questions about the green economy
project.
•Indeed, one of the main targets in your book
is carbon trading. You suggest the system
leads to absurd situations, such a booming
industry in unmarketable refrigerators in
China because the HFC-23 emissions trade is
very profitable. What is exactly the problem
with this approach?
LIEVENS: There are many problems with emis-
sions trading, but they are situated on two levels.
First there are practical problems with the way
it has been organised and implemented. Many
people would defend emissions trading saying:
“Okay, we made mistakes. The system is not op-
timal, but it is a trial-and-error process. We now
see that there were some errors that should be
corrected. For example, we should no longer give
emissions freely to the companies, but they
should be auctioned. Companies should pay for
the emission rights.” So a number of corrections
are being debated or are upcoming, which is a
good thing. It is thanks to critical voices of schol-
ars and NGOs that certain corrections of the
emissions trading system are upcoming. 
But there are also more fundamental
problems with the system. Let me mention two
principal problems. One is that emission trading
considers all types of emissions as equal. Emis-
sions by cars are equal to emissions caused by
building a windmill or to emissions caused by
agriculture, etc. They are all rendered equal,
which facilitates trade between different types of
emission rights. What we say is that the chal-
lenge ahead of us is to fundamentally transform
our current form of society. If you want to tackle
climate change, you have to fundamentally
change the structures of society. This is a political
process, which involves choosing priorities. We
have to develop strategies which allow us to go
where we want to go. From the perspective of so-
cial and political change, emissions to heat hos-
pitals or schools cannot just be equated with
emissions of aviation, cars or coal-fired power
plants. From a social or political point of view,
these are radically different things. It is good that
we build new windmills, even though their pro-
duction results in more emissions. We need these
windmills, so we have to accept that there are
CO2-emissions there. But you cannot just equal-
ize that with building new coal-fired power
plants. One is a step in a direction of a low-car-
bon society, the other means that we are stuck in
a high-carbon fossil fuel system. The problem of
the emissions trading is that it equalizes things
that might be equal from the point of view of cli-
mate science - for the climate, the source of CO2
emissions does not matter. But from a social and
a political perspective, it does. Different sources
of emissions are politically and socially not equal
at all. 
Our second criticism can be explained in
view of the big challenge of the upcoming climate
summit in Paris in 2015. After Copenhagen, this
will be provide a new opportunity to realize a
breakthrough. There are some signs that the US
and China are changing strategies. So they could
perhaps arrive at a kind of agreement, which as
such would be a good thing. But I am afraid of
two things, namely (1) if there is an agreement,
it will not be ambitious enough and (2) it will be
completely based on carbon trading. 
You could argue: ”Okay, the agreement is
not enough, but it is a step in the good direction
and then individual countries, for example in Eu-
rope, can make steps beyond these limited objec-
tives.” In a number of western European
countries, where there is a relatively strong social
and ecological movement which can put pressure
on the government, it might be possible to go be-
yond those targets. But the problem is that this
becomes impossible because of the emissions
trading system. Imagine that in Belgium we
would impose additional rules on the energy sec-
tor stipulating that energy-producing companies
have to stick to certain standards and use the
newest machines, installations and technology.
As a result, they emit less CO2. The problem is
that as a result, there would be glut of superflu-
ous emission rights. The energy companies will
have emissions rights that they will not use,
thanks to these latest installations and technolo-
gies. These emissions rights will come to the
market, and as a result the price of emission
rights will go down. It will become much cheaper
for other companies to buy these rights, so they
don’t have to do any effort themselves. It is a
complex story, but the point is that once you have
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an emissions trading system, you cannot go
further. You cannot be much more ambitious
than the objectives of the system. You know the
amount of CO2 and other greenhouse gasses
that will be emitted. If you take additional
measures for some sectors, this will give an in-
centive to other companies and sectors not to
do an effort, but to buy extra emissions rights.
That is the big risk. We will be stuck in a sys-
tem that is not ambitious enough and does not
allow for what is really necessary to stabilize
the climate. There would be a small break-
through, but it will put a straightjacket on
what is possible for the near future. These are
our more principled critiques of carbon trading
systems.
•There is a clear tendency in ecological dis-
cussions to focus on individual behaviour.
So ecological issues are framed as respon-
sibility of the consumer. He has to recycle,
buy sustainable goods and save energy, etc.
Would you agree on this? 
LIEVENS: That is actually a point that An-
neleen has been working and publishing on.
First of all, I think it is very important to ex-
periment with alternative practices. I try to do
this as well: I am a vegetarian, engaged in co-
housing, I don’t have a car, I go everywhere by
public transportation, etc. There is a lot that
we can do and it is important that we do it. At
the same time, it's a complete illusion to think
that this will really bring fundamental change.
That is the paradox with which we are con-
fronted. Why do I do it then? It is a matter of
consistency as an activist who is trying to in-
tervene in the public debate on ecology, to also
try to implement what you think. It is also im-
portant to develop certain skills. 
If we ever want a sustainable society, then we
will need to re-develop certain skills such as re-
pairing your bike, cooking vegetarian food, liv-
ing in a different way. Another very important
motivation for such practical experiments is to
become more autonomous from big corpora-
tions and from money. If you don't have a car
and share a lot, you need less income.
That being said, it is very problematic
to present individual behaviour change as a
strategy for change, which it is not. It is a drop
in the ocean, it will not fundamentally change
the structures of the fossil-fuel economy, the
power of the big corporations or the power of
the state. A number of NGOs, companies and
also governments have set up campaigns that
try to influence and steer people's behaviour,
which can be problematic for many reasons. 
If you try to steer people’s behaviour, the rela-
tion you have with these people can be prob-
lematic: it is paternalistic at best, but often it
amounts to forms of discipline. It is rather
problematic from a democratic and emancipa-
tory point of view, but it also gives a wrong
image of what the ecological crisis is about. It
is a huge thing, an enormous challenge. If you
only look at climate change, the changes that
are needed in our society are fundamental.
Suggesting that one can change something by
changing individual behaviour, you underesti-
mate the challenge. 
You give the impression that the problem is not
so big at all, that it can just be enough to recy-
cle a bit or to wear an extra sweater. The result
is that people underestimate what climate
change and the ecological crisis are about. If
you look at the current public debate, the chal-
lenge is fundamentally underestimated and I
think this focus on individual behaviour con-
tributes to that. 
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Third party payer system
•Perhaps a bit related to that: Society has lost
its ecological spirit a bit after the financial
crisis. We are now more concerned with
economy then with ecology but in your book
you argue that you cannot separate these two
problems because they are somehow related
to one another. How is this possible?
LIEVENS: It is interesting that shortly after the
economic-financial crisis erupted, we observed a
reduction of CO2 emissions, in European coun-
tries at least. This shows that negative economic
growth can help. It might be an unwelcome or
difficult conclusion, but shrinking the economy
contributes to reducing emissions. This observa-
tion fundamentally challenges our current eco-
nomic system. 
Of course, the financial crisis and its con-
sequences are still there. For the next ten or fif-
teen years the results will be weighing upon our
shoulders. We will have to act on climate change
in the next ten to twenty years in a context of lin-
gering economic (semi-)crisis. This is not an op-
timistic story because it will be difficult. You will
have high unemployment, so the risk is that the
focus will be on relaunching the economy and re-
alising new economic growth. What you see is
that the environmental message is disappearing
from the public debate today. Both the govern-
ment, the left and social movements are talking
about austerity and social issues, not environ-
mental ones. At the same time it is within this
context that activists, environmentally conscious
citizens or political parties will have to bring in
an environmental message and try to combine
social and environmental issues. You can do that
on many different levels. Something I often stress
when I speak to trade unionists is that you can
do a lot which is both socially just and ecologi-
cally sustainable at the same time. Houses and
buildings in Belgium, for example, are among the
worst isolated in the whole of Europe. In our
neighbouring countries isolation standards are
much higher. So there is a huge effort to be done
to isolate houses, but the problem is of course
that those people who live in the worst isolated
houses are often the least well-off. Some people
don't have the financial means to invest in extra
isolation. So we have to think about ways to
tackle that problem. The governmental program
of the previous Flemish government referred to
the idea of the ‘third party payer system’. 
The idea is that you set up a fund with which you
pre-finance isolation investments. You can
thereby target those people who have the least fi-
nancial means. The result is that these people
will live in better circumstances, their quality of
life increases and their expenses for heating go
down. With the net financial difference, they can
gradually pay back the amount that has been pre-
financed. This can be a kind of loan without or
with very little rent. The key issue is that people
live in better houses without having to do the fi-
nancial investments immediately. Such mecha-
nisms can be socially just if they target the right
groups and would make a huge difference for the
climate because heating is, certainly in Flan-
ders/Belgium, one of the main sources of CO2
emissions. You could thereby also create new
jobs. I think you can intervene in the public de-
bate with these demands in a context of crisis
and still do useful things.
There are other issues to work on, like the
way the current government is cutting the
budget for public transport. Progressive social
and political forces, including the labour move-
ments are right to make a big story about that:
Stop these cuts and invest in public transport. It
is ecologically sound, socially just and on the
longer term it will pay off. You will have to invest
less in extra roads, there will be less traffic jams.
Even from an economic point of view, it is rea-
sonable to do so. But there is a kind of short
term-ism at play in the context of crisis which
means we risk to have to pay more on the longer
term.
•You mentioned that one of the main incom-
patibilities is the one between economic
growth and the earth, but what would then a
non-growth economy look like? 
LIEVENS: I don't have a blueprint, but I have
some ideas. It is a big challenge. We know that a
market economy cannot function without
growth. We also know there is no growth without
adding extra pressure to the ecosystem. So we are
stuck there.If you take the criticism of growth se-
riously, you have to think in terms of alternatives
beyond capitalism, beyond an economy based on
profit and growth, which is very difficult because
we don't have any models.
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The more we can liberate 
ourselves from market logic, 
the better our steps toward a
sustainable direction.
It has been tried in the twentieth century and we
all know it failed. So it is a huge intellectual chal-
lenge to rethink what a post-capitalist, demo-
cratic non-growth economy might look like. A
number of academics are doing great work on
that, a debate is emerging. But that is only intel-
lectual work. The real political challenge is of
course to start implementing alternative eco-
nomic systems. One of the interesting develop-
ments we observe in the context of the financial
crisis, is that a number of groups and actors are
trying to invent or re-invent new economic
forms. For example, a fascinating and diverse
movement is emerging to set up ‘commons’ as an
alternative both to private and state property. Re-
lated to this, there is alsso a resurgence of the
idea of cooperatives. It is still a small part of the
economy but in the context of the financial crisis
you have initiatives here and there for energy co-
operatives. One is being set up in Ghent, where I
live. You have NewB, a cooperative bank under
construction. That is a specific strategy to work
on alternative economic forms, but of course we
will also have to confront the economy as it is
and that will require a struggle, on different
fronts, with the fossil fuel system as our main tar-
get. We have to re-think what our possible al-
liances are, how we can integrate the labour
movement into a strategy against the fossil-fuel
system. 
That is a struggle that we will have to wage in
the next ten to thirty years I think. I don't have a
blueprint, I have some general ideas, and a num-
ber of experiments are going on. The criterion is
whether we are moving in the direction of an al-
ternative form of social organisation based on
less market. The mainstream is now going in an-
other direction by increasing the weight of the
market. That is also the logic behind the so-called
‘green economy’. It is marketing ever new areas
of social life. Our criterion should be different.
The more we can liberate ourselves from the
market logic, the more leverage we can gain over
our future, and the easier it becomes to make
steps in a sustainable direction. We can do this
for example by setting up cooperatives, by impos-
ing new government rules on companies, by re-
ducing the pressure of the market by sharing, by
setting up systems for commons, etc. These de-
bates and practices are emerging and I think this
is the way to go. It is not the solution, but it's at
least a perspective. 
•You mentioned the labour unions, as you
did also in your book, as a possible partner in
the solution but what precise role can they
play? Some say that they have become some-
what obsolete or not only focused on ecolog-
ical issues and sometimes in conflict with it,
for instance, when it comes to jobs and
growth. Are they really an ally?
LIEVENS: What needs to be stressed first of all
is that in Belgium, we have quite strong trade
unions, especially if we compare our situation to
other European countries. The fact that the gov-
ernment and right-wing parties speak out so
strongly against them testifies to that: they know
trade unions have a real, albeit potential political
force. Of course, the labour movement has been
weakened a lot during the last decades, but po-
tentially they are still a strong force.
If you have millions of members, you can be a
force in  society.
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Secondly, they are not homogenous, pre-
cisely because they are so big. For example ABVV,
or FGTB [Belgian socialist labour union], is very
diverse. It is organised according to sectors, each
of which has specific traditions, debates, ap-
proaches etcetera. Trade unions are also spaces
of internal struggle and debates which you don't
see as an outsider. The trade union mainstream
is often very moderate, focused on jobs and eco-
nomic growth, as you mentioned, but you also
have alternative currents which are often more
radical, sometimes anti-capitalist or anti-neolib-
eral. Groups of workers sometimes start sponta-
neous actions, challenging the trade union
leadership to engage in new debate. Some sec-
tions of the trade unions are very open and re-
ceptive to ecological ideas. They are eager to
learn and to absorb ideas from environmental
movements and to try to integrate them into
their practices. Ecologically minded people, aca-
demics, intellectuals and activists can play a role
there, engaging in this debate and trying to
‘green’ the strategies and direction of trade
unions. Sometimes the actual situation helps
with that. The current right-wing government
that is making strong cuts obliges trade unions
to rethink their role. Until now they were just a
negotiating partner for the government, but, if
the government no longer wants to negotiate,
what is their role? They have to re-envision them-
selves. That process has only just started. Ecolo-
gists and critical intellectuals can play a part in
that, for instance, through associations like 'Hart
boven hard' [heart above hard, a citizens' initia-
tive]. In view of the mobilisation that will take
place in the upcoming months, it is important
that ecologists are also present there with their
own banners and slogans to bring in an ecologi-
cal message, around demands like the ones I
mentioned before: better isolation of houses,
labour time reduction, etc. There are clear exam-
ples of social demands which are also ecological
and which can be put forward or defended by
trade unions. We often don't realise it, but the
potential is there. 
•Most of the ecological problems are rather
urgent, but is it possible to change the econ-
omy overnight? 
LIEVENS: No, and that is a reason to be very
pessimistic. The question is whether we are al-
ready beyond a critical threshold. Some say we
are already past that point. Politics is, however,
about contingency and sometimes things can go 
fast. But we have to admit we are losing precious
time. We need rapid changes and we haven’t even
started for real yet, though we know that chang-
ing economic structures is a huge challenge. We
can try to build relations of forces, use every oc-
casion that we have to push things in the right
direction. Sometimes history can accelerate. It is
not always a slow process. Occasionally radical
changes can happen. Look at the fall of the Berlin
wall and even the financial crisis, which has put
certain things in motion. We have to hope that
similar accelerations happen in the field of envi-
ronmentalism, although we know what the ob-
stacles and difficulties are. I am rather
pessimistic, but I am still engaged and try to help
move things in the right direction. 
•What do you think would happen if indeed
this green revolution will not come? Do you
think this ‘green economy’ way of thinking
will muddle on or that there will be some
kind of drastic, authoritarian moves of the
government to impose some kind of green
policy without any democratic participa-
tion? 
LIEVENS: I think the green economy project
will go on, even though it is already in crisis. The
ideas are there and are being implemented, but
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the fossil fuel system and the economic interests
that are behind it. Nevertheless, I think that it is
now becoming the paradigm and it will be im-
plemented to a certain degree. So if we can't rad-
ically change the direction, we have to make sure
that the ‘really existing’ green economy is as eco-
logically effective and socially just as possible.
The worst aspects of emissions trading should be
avoided. We can put pressure in order to correct
the system as much as we can. Realistically
speaking that is what we can do. That doesn’t
mean that we have to sit around the table with
multinationals and set up common initiatives, as
some big NGO’s are doing. We have to keep put-
ting pressure on the project from the outside and
raise our critical voices to make sure the people
advocating the green economy project are chal-
lenged by our criticism. They are already chang-
ing policies concerning agro-fuels as a result of
criticism. The same is the case with corrections
being undertaken for emissions trading. So you
see that resistance, opposition, criticism can be
important. That might be what we will have to
do in the upcoming years. If the situation comes
so far that climate change becomes uncontrol-
lable and difficult to predict, we might see bar-
baric situations, forms of dictatorship, mass
migration and refugees, new forms of racism. It
is not a very optimistic picture, but this is what
we can expect. If resources become increasingly
scarce there will be resource wars. There are al-
ready geopolitical tensions for agricultural land.
Who will own the land on which we will produce
our food? Interesting from a geopolitical stance,
but also very dangerous. That is the strategic
field we are in and where we have to play our
role.
•So it seems the world is doomed, but to end
on a slightly more positive note; what do you
recommend our readers to do for the green
revolution?
LIEVENS: We are confronted with a long
process of reinventing what forming a society
and living together means, rather than with one
sudden moment of change. My advice would be:
become a member of a critical NGO, a trade
union or a political party, engage yourself and try
to realise forms of collective change, on whatever
level. Move beyond individual change and try to
do politics in a democratic way. I don't have a
program that precisely stipulates what should be
done. Try to play a role as a collective, build rela-
tions of forces, set up action groups, coopera-
tives, sharing initiatives and so on. We are more
than just individuals, we are also citizens and we
have to play our role in the democratic
game.Move beyond individual change and try to
do politics in a democratic way. That is the basic
message I give to everyone. I don't have a pro-
gram that says what to do. Try to play a role as a
collective, build relations of forces, if it’s within
an action group or cooperative and so on. We are
more than just individuals, we are also citizens
and you have to play your role in the democratic
game. 
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